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Foreword
Even if the story of the concept of the sublime is, as Marek Kulisz argues in 
one of the papers in this book, a story of a certain mistake or mistranslation of 
the Greek peri hypsous into its Latin equivalent, yet the sublime remains an 
intriguing notion penetrating the areas of both aesthetics and ethics. And the 
very fact of a possibly erroneous choice of name for a concept does not 
interfere with the concept’s productivity; in this respect the sublime would 
provide another proof, after Heidegger’s unconcealment of the interlingual 
distortions of logos forcefully confined to the place of ‘reason’, of the profound 
indebtedness of Western philosophy to the Babelian operation of (mis) 
translation. It is perhaps for this reason that this volume, from the very outset, 
falls short of any precise definition of the sublime. Rather, it (mis) translates this 
category into a number of discourses ranging from philosophical, via literary, 
to a cross-cultural look into the domains of art and arts.
It is this positioning of the sublime at the intersection of the philosophical 
and aesthetic (let us remember Blake’s famous aphorism from The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell according to which “The most sublime act is to set another 
before you”) which early on activated in this concept various meaning 
generating protocols. Kant’s two statements from his analysis of the dynamic 
of the sublime seem to be trail blazing: in the first one the philosopher bridges 
the gap between ontology (things which are ‘there’, a landscape) and aesthetics 
(“To call the ocean sublime we must regard it as poets do, merely by what the 
eye reveals — if it is at rest, as a clear mirror of water only bounded by 
heavens; if it is stormy, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm everything”), in 
the other he grafts ethical reflection upon the aesthetic (“A feeling for the 
sublime in nature cannot well be thought without combining therewith 
a mental disposition which is akin to the moral”).
This volume begins with two essays on Kant and his presentation of the 
sublime as a spectacle of stone and distance, the dramatic highlight of which is 
a certain crucial blindness of the power to imagine, a paradox of geometrical 
imagination deprived of adequate geometric signs. Hence the oxymoronic 
paradox of “geometry of irregularity” implicit in the idea of the idea closure 
“announced by Kant’s blind imagination”, as Noel Gray puts it in his paper, by 
the imagination which closes its eyes, as it were, to boundlessness and infinity 
translating (or perhaps (mis) translating) them into the idea-infinity in which 
human reason can still grasp, and thus also regulate, all irregularities in 
a geometrical fashion — an idea now reverberating in Fractal geometry which 
claims to be the geometry of what we see and feel.
What is thus also at stake in the Kantian notion of the sublime is a certain 
petrification of the infinite and the irregular which inaugurates the distance 
between man and monumental nature, nature translated into a monument 
which we should not approach too close lest it should lose its monumentality 
and become a threat, the full emotional effect which, in Kant, always “calls for 
regulation/discipline of distance” (Liliana Barakonska, Malgorzata Nitka). Yet, 
rather than securely living in the domestic (orderly regulated) space of home of 
beauty (“beauty is a peace-keeping force”), Kant goes to war so as to avoid the 
effeminating effects of peace, and to prove the distancing power of reason in the 
face of the sublime/enemy. War is not quite sublime for Kant, it only has 
“something sublime about it” provided it “is conducted with order and a sacred 
respect for the rights of civilians”. It is exactly in homecoming from a war 
(between the faculties, for instance) that Kant’s philosophical strategy finds 
a security of position (both epistemological and ontological) thus averting his 
eyes from both the beautiful as “too orderly” and the sublime as “too 
dangerous” so as to himself “elude being turned to stone in the face of Isis, the 
returning figure of Kant’s writings”.
Herman Melville, as Jerzy Sobieraj argues in his essay on Battle Pieces, 
qualifies the war with somewhat similar hesitation. On the one hand it 
endorses the sublime by being a “terrible tragedy of our time” and, on the other 
hand, precisely due to the Kantian “lack of respect for the rights of civilians it 
becomes morally suspect and thus alienates itself from the moral disposition of 
the sublime”. It is this double qualification of “our times” as not only 
a “tragedy” but also as “the terrible” that puts the category of the sublime in 
question in Melville’s Battle Pieces.
What somehow negatively links the philosophy of Blake and Nietzsche 
with Kant (or Burke) is Blake’s and Nietzsche’s denial that the sublime and the 
beautiful are two distinct things or categories. For Blake, as Tadeusz Slawek 
claims in his article, the sublime is not petrified in the solidity of some identity 
without the Other. Rather, the sublime is seen as the ability “to avoid 
formlessness” without consolidating into a form. This ability is realized in the
act of “sublime Labour”, or hammering one’s self, and not in the reproductive 
operation of memory. For Nietzsche, similarly, the problem of the sublime is 
the problem of its categorization in the classic formulations which are “too 
foreseeable and normative”. Nietzsche’s sublime is always excessive, more than 
itself, a rejection of all thought of self-identity achievable in the downward 
movement which he calls “descent towards visibility”.
Claire Hobbs reads Blake and Walter Benjamin as collectors of “minute 
particulars”, of proverbs or detachable quotations which are not so much 
repetitions of something else but reproductions which always already mean 
something else and whose use does not preserve the past but puts the past to 
use in the present Dealing with particulars we thus always already deal with 
something else, with the “another” of Blake’s “The most sublime act”. Read as 
an act, or an action, the sublime in Blake and Benjamin subverts the action 
suspending and powerless (or even helpless) sublime feeling of Burke’s or 
Kant’s. By reinstating particularity “in an invincible concern for an o th e r” 
both Blake and Benjamin also break with the transcendentality of the sublime, 
its movement towards the formless whose aesthetization by the eighte­
enth-century theorists of the sublime was a step towards fascism’s aes­
thetization of “the politics of privation”.
The notion of collecting features prominently in Zbigniew Bialas’ reading of 
the sublime which is interpreted in a manner reversing, if not parodying, Kant’s 
moralized concept of the sublime immensity. In Bialas’s paper the sublime, in 
a characteristically postmodernist turn, is a concept where the aesthetically 
excessive (e.g. accumulation of cliches) meets its ethical equivalent (the sublime 
as the excess of desire resulting in the erotic obsession).
Commodifaction of the sublime traceable in cinema is also one of the 
themes in Paul Coats’ essay on sublimity and film where the sublime is defined, 
in Thomas Weiskel’s words, as the Oedipal defence against the ambivalence of 
a “wish to be inundated ahd a simultaneous anxiety of annihilation”. Further, 
central for Kant’s theory the separation of the beautiful from the sublime 
marks the emergence of the male identity as independent from the mother’s 
domination.
Kant’s conflict, or war, of faculties and his writings on the sublime form 
a theoretical background of J-F. Lyotard’s attempts at theorizing the post­
modern. The sublime which, as “unpresentable”, could not be an object of 
a reasonable philosophical investigation for Kant whose interests in nature 
were interests in the “totality of rules” (as he defined it), becomes the sphere 
which postmodernism attempts, however paradoxically, at putting in presen­
tation itself. Tadeusz Rachwal’s essay traces such postmodern attempts 
beginning with H. P. Lovecraft’s “The Unnamable” (using Lovecraft’s “misspel­
led” version of the word) as a somehow anachronic expression of Lyotard’s 
concern with the possibility that what is properly human might be inhabited by
the inhuman, and ending with Helene Cixous feminine voice as the voice 
approaching the sublime without positing it as a distinct category. Though, as 
she claims, her voice is a voice which has not sublimated, it is exactly in the 
refusal to being categorized that her “I will Yes” can “only go on and on, 
without ever inscribing or distinguishing the contours” in a writing without 
d is ta n c e , the notion which motivated the theoreticians of the sublime such as 
Burke or K ant
To speak about the sublime must also touch upon a discussion of the human 
perception and the inherent problem of the image transforming the reality of 
immediate consciousness into a visual and intellectual judgement This relation­
ship o f‘being’ and ‘being represented’ lying at the foundation of the sublime must 
attract semiotic analytical attention and, as Emanuel Prower’s paper is trying to 
demonstrate, the Peircean notion of the First comes in handy when investigating 
the sublime as the metamorphosing power through which what is unsusceptible 
of mediation is rendered as interpretable (like Witkacy’s “Pure Form”, for 
instance, whose programmatic immediacy, as Marta Zając argues, makes it 
possible to relate it to the concept of the sublime).
Looking at the notion of the sublime in Langland’s Piers Plowman, Andrzej 
Wicher argues that in the Middle Ages this notion was highly suspect on 
ethical rather than aesthetic grounds. The source of the suspicion was man’s 
yearning for infinity and immortality whose manifestations could always be 
“of the devil’s making”. Hence the necessity of distinguishing between “the true 
sublime” and “the false sublime” which, on moral and religious grounds, is of 
vital importance as decisive about man’s damnation or salvation. Langland’s 
“metaphysical suspiciousness” reflected in Piers Plowman seems to result from 
his consistent attempts at unmasking the false sublime, at devising a reliable 
method of distinguishing between the true and the false sublime.
The theorization of the sublime on the aesthetic grounds in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries finds its reflection in the writings which become 
centered on the question of the landscape and a variety of literary and painterly 
conventions which worked towards the invention of vertiginous images of 
sublime power operating both within Gothic and Romantic traditions as well 
as in the practice of Thomas Cook’s organized tourism. The focus on the 
sublime in Gothic fiction as well as its rigorous exclusion in modern detective 
fiction both spring, as David Jarrett claims in his paper, from explorations of 
the Romantic Sublime reinvigorated in the nineteenth century in the Victorian 
context of imperial expansionism.
It is with the task of approaching all these (and many more) issues (which as 
hinging on the threshold of the unpresentable or the unnameable cannot be 
a subject of a presentation pure and simple) that we present this volume to the 
Reader.
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